A novel measure of changes in force applied to the Perruchet Effect. by Bartlett, M et al.
A Novel Measure of Changes in Force Applied to the Perruchet Effect. 
 
Madeleine Bartlett (mb535@exeter.ac.uk) 
Amy Strivens (as710@exeter.ac.uk) 
William G. Nicholson (W.G.Nicholson@exeter.ac.uk) 
Rosamund McLaren (R.P.McLaren@exeter.ac.uk) 
Ian P.L. McLaren (I.P.L.McLaren@exeter.ac.uk) 
 
School of Psychology, University of Exeter, UK. 
 
 
Abstract 
The reaction time (RT) version of the Perruchet Effect is based 
on a concurrent dissociation between RTs to respond and 
conscious expectancy of the outcome across runs of repeated 
trials. Consequently, the Perruchet Effect is considered strong 
evidence for multiple learning processes. This conclusion, 
however, relies on the RT trend being driven by associative 
learning rather than, as some have argued, US recency or 
priming mechanisms. Recent research examining the 
mechanisms underlying the RT trend do so by examining 
motor activity associated with the response. With this aim in 
mind, the current study developed, and assessed the usefulness 
of, a novel method to measure changes in the amount of force 
applied to the response button in an RT Perruchet paradigm. 
The results obtained could not be explained by a single 
mechanism, but suggest multiple factors underlying the RT 
version of the Perruchet effect.  
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Introduction 
Pavlovian conditioning involves pairing a neutral stimulus 
(the conditioned stimulus, CS) with a motivationally 
significant stimulus (the unconditioned stimulus, US) which 
provokes an automatic, unconditioned response (UR). 
Repeated pairings of the CS and the US leads to the 
development of a conditioned response (CR) which is 
produced in response to the CS (Pearce, 2013). Despite being 
well established, there is still some debate regarding the 
mechanisms behind the development of the CR in humans. 
Consequently, two main classes of learning model have 
emerged: one which proposes a single, propositional learning 
mechanism (Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009), and a 
dual processing model (McLaren, Green & Mackintosh, 
1994). The propositional approach argues that the CR 
develops because participants become aware of the CS-US 
contingency and can verbalise it as a rule (Mitchell, De 
Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). In contrast, the dual process 
account posits that, as well as this propositional system, the 
CR can also be learned through the formation of associations 
between mental representations of events such that activation 
of one automatically activates the other (McLaren, Green, & 
Mackintosh, 1994). 
 
Whilst there has been some difficulty in providing 
evidence for one approach over the other, robust evidence in 
support of the dual process account comes from experiments 
examining the Perruchet Effect. The Perruchet Effect is the 
concurrent dissociation between conscious expectancies for 
an outcome, and behavioural responses to that outcome under 
a partial reinforcement schedule (Perruchet, 1985). By 
presenting the same CS on every trial, but only pairing it with 
the reinforcement US on 50% of trials, the paradigm allows 
the two learning mechanisms (propositional and associative) 
to predict opposing outcomes. The propositional account 
predicts that, because participants are explicitly aware of the 
50/50 probability of US occurrence, repeated presentations of 
reinforced trials lead participants to have a higher expectation 
of a non-reinforced trial (following the gambler’s fallacy; 
Burns & Corpus, 2004). Conversely, the associative account 
predicts that repeated CS-US pairings strengthen the 
association between the CS and the CR and lead to faster or 
more pronounced responses. Both patterns are evident in the 
Perruchet Effect; the propositional prediction is found in 
participants’ conscious expectancies, and the associative 
prediction is found in the behavioural responses.  
There has been some debate regarding whether the pattern 
of behavioural responses in the Perruchet Effect does reflect 
associative learning, or whether it is due to a US 
recency/priming effect. US recency/priming predicts that 
changes in the CR are due to the recent presentation of the 
US, priming the participant to produce a response 
(Weidemann, McAndrew, Livesey, & McLaren, 2016). 
According to this account, recent response performance 
reduces the activation threshold for subsequent responses, 
making them easier to produce (Fecteau & Munoz, 2007).  
The response recency account has been examined, with a 
focus on its predictions regarding motor activation, in 
McLaren et al, (2018). They utilized a Go-NoGo paradigm 
(see Verbruggen et al, 2016) in which participants were 
shown a brown cylinder (the CS) on every trial, followed by 
one of two US’s (the words “Peanut Butter” or “Brown 
Sugar”), each of which was presented on 50% of trials. One 
of the US’s was designated the goUS (+) and the other the 
nogoUS (-). They measured RTs and participants’ 
expectancies regarding which US would appear on the 
upcoming trial. McLaren et al (2018) also examined muscular 
activity before and during a trial by measuring Motor Evoked 
Potentials (MEPs). It was hypothesized that, if the Perruchet 
Effect involves associative learning, no preparatory motor 
activity should be seen until presentation of the CS. However, 
if there is a US recency/priming effect, motor preparation 
should be evident before the CS, during the ITI. McLaren et 
al found that preparatory motor activation was present during 
the ITI, but this was relatively independent of the number of 
goUS trials (i.e. run length within a trial of a given type, + or 
-), depending more on whether a goUS had been presented on 
the previous trial or not. Another component was CS 
dependent, and this varied with run length. These findings 
suggest that changes in motor activation may not be 
influenced solely by the associative strength of the CS-goUS 
relationship, but by a combination of this factor and some sort 
of priming.  
The current study 
The current study utilized the same paradigm as McLaren 
et al’s (2018) except for the MEP methodology. The MEP 
method does provide useful insights into motor activity, but 
it is costly, time-consuming and uncomfortable for the 
participant. In addition, only one measurement can be taken 
per trial, and therefore changes in motor response over the 
course of a single trial cannot be studied. The current study 
aimed to develop a less demanding technique which would 
provide continuous data about motor activity. The novel 
method was designed to measure changes in the amount of 
force (Δforce) applied to a response pedal. Developing and 
evaluating this technique for its ability to provide useful data 
was the central aim of this study. Analysis was, therefore, 
largely exploratory. We predicted we would find the standard 
Perruchet Effect in the RT and expectancy data. We also 
examined whether the Δforce data provided any insights into 
the onset of preparatory motor activation, and these results 
are discussed with reference to associative, propositional and 
other accounts of the Perruchet Effect.  
 
The Experiment 
Method 
Design and subjects The experiment used a within subjects 
design, comparing RTs, expectancies and Δforce across 
different run lengths. Sixty-nine subjects were recruited from 
the student body of the University of Exeter. Of these, eight 
were excluded from analysis; six due to not completing the 
experimental task and two due to software failures during 
data collection. A total of sixty-one participants were 
included in analysis (45 female; mean age 22.33 with a range 
of 18-40 years). Participants were either paid £7.50 or 
awarded 1.5 course credits for participation.  
 
Force measure The manipulandum designed for this 
experiment acted as the response pedal. The final design 
consisted of two parts (see Figure 1); a pedal, which allows 
for more dynamic variations in force than a simple button, 
and a force transducer, which converts the amount of pressure 
applied to the surface of the pedal into a voltage proportional 
to the rate of change in the amount of force applied. The force 
transducer was fitted around the middle finger of the 
participant’s left hand, in-between the two phalangeal joints. 
This position minimised any pulse read-out whilst still being 
a comfortable part of the finger through which to apply force 
to the pedal. Participants had to constantly apply a downward 
force to the pedal throughout the experiment. This was to 
provide a higher-than-resting level of motor activation, 
making the pedal-press responses and changes in force more 
easily detectable. 
 
Figure 1: Photograph of the response pedal as participants 
were instructed to use it 
 
Pilot tests identified the most suitable block length to 
prevent discomfort from the prolonged strain of constantly 
pressing down on the pedal. Participants were also allowed to 
take as much time to rest between blocks as they needed.  
 
Stimuli and apparatus The experimental task was presented 
using E-Prime 1.0 software on a PC. The stimuli used are the 
same as those used by McLaren et al (2018). Each trial started 
with the CS, a static image of a brown cylinder, presented for 
five seconds. This was immediately followed by one of the 
two USs (“Brown Sugar” or “Peanut Butter”) upon 
termination. The designation of which US was the goUS was 
counter-balanced across participants, and each was presented 
on half of the trials 
Participants gave expectancy ratings during CS 
presentations on every trial. Ratings of how likely the 
nogoUS was were made from one (low expectation of 
nogoUS) to five (high expectation of nogoUS) on the five 
keys of a Contour ShuttleXpress button using their right 
hand. Ratings were taken for this US in order to focus 
attention on it rather than the goUS, as we have found this 
technique useful for producing the Perruchet effect when two 
explicit outcomes are available (McAndrew et al, 2013). 
These ratings were then converted into ratings for the goUS 
using the formula goUS rating = 6-nogoUS rating. 
Participants used their left hand to give a speeded RT 
response to the presentation of the goUS using the response 
pedal. The US terminated either when a response was given 
or after two seconds. A tone was broadcast for 500ms if an 
incorrect response, or no response, was made. The ITI varied 
randomly between 2-3 seconds.  
To assess the effects of different run lengths of repeated 
trials, a repeated-measures factor of run length (number of a 
given trial type that occur in a row) was constructed. This 
factor had ten levels; -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, +1, +2, +3, +4, +5 (“-” 
indicates nogoUS trials, “+” indicates goUS trials). Response 
measurements were taken on the trial after the run itself. 
Sequences of 348 trials were constructed with a binomial 
distribution of the different run lengths (see Table 1). 
Sequences were split into 12 blocks of varying lengths. An 
additional four trials were added to the beginning of each 
sequence as practice trials, giving a total of 352 trials.  
 
Table 1. Distribution of run types. 
 Non-reinforced 
(nogoUS) 
Reinforced (goUS) 
Run 
length 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Number 
of runs 
3 6 21 45 93 93 45 21 6 3 
 
Procedure Participants were told the following cover story 
before beginning the experiment: “You are playing the role 
of a doctor whose patients all have diabetes. Each of your 
patients has eaten a meal before calling you. The meal is 
represented on the screen as a brown cylinder. Half of the 
time, the brown cylinder represents peanut butter, and the 
other half of the time it represents brown sugar, but you 
cannot tell which one. When you see the brown cylinder, you 
need to rate how much you think the patient has eaten peanut 
butter by pressing one of the five buttons on the 
ShuttleXpress with your right hand. These ratings range 
from: 1 (“It definitely won’t be peanut butter”) to 5 (“It 
definitely will be peanut butter”). If the patient has eaten 
brown sugar you need to administer insulin as quickly as 
possible by pressing the pedal all the way down using your 
left hand. However, if the patient has eaten peanut butter you 
don’t need to do anything.” Half of the participants were 
given this scenario (Brown Sugar as the goUS), the other half 
were told patients had a nut allergy and the goUS was Peanut 
Butter. The sequence of events was the same for all 
participants (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 2: Diagram of the two trial types in the experiment. 
 
Once these instructions were given, participants had the 
transducer fitted to the middle finger of their left hand and 
were instructed on how to position their hand on the response 
pedal to ensure that the transducer was flat against the pedal 
and their finger. They were also instructed to apply constant 
downward pressure – enough to feel that they were exerting 
effort but not enough to move the pedal.  
After completing the experimental task participants filled in 
a short questionnaire to assess their knowledge of the 
paradigm and any strategies they employed to complete the 
task. They were then debriefed and thanked. The experiment 
lasted approximately one hour and fifteen minutes.  
Results  
All data was analysed using repeated measures (RM) 
ANOVAs on IBM SPSS Statistics 23. If Mauchly’s test for 
sphericity was violated for any analysis, degrees of freedom 
were corrected using the Huynh-Feldt method. To check for 
outlier influences, median values for each participant were 
calculated and subjected to the same analyses as the means. 
No substantial differences were found when this was done, 
indicating that outliers did not cause significant biases in the 
analyses using means, and hence these are reported here.  
For RT, expectancy and Δforce, means were calculated first 
as a function of run length. Run lengths 4 and 5 did not 
provide sufficient data (see Table 1, their frequency of 
occurrence is low) for reliable analysis (except in the case of 
expectancies which are less variable) so only data from run 
lengths -3 to +3 were used. Then factors of prior US 
experience and Level were constructed. The prior US 
experience factor looks at the effect of US absence/presence 
in the preceding trial (i.e. – vs. + trials). The Level factor 
involved collapsing run lengths -3 and +1 (Level 1), -2 and 
+2 (Level 2), and -1 and +3 (Level 3), thereby capturing the 
influence of run length within a given trial type (McLaren et 
al, 2018).  
 
Response times RTs for responses made on each go trial 
were recorded in milliseconds using E-Prime. Data was 
extracted for all go trials on which a response was made, and 
analysed separately as a function of run length, Level and 
prior US experience. Our findings replicated the standard 
pattern found in RT Perruchet experiments (see Figure 2). 
Participants responded faster after go trials than after no-go 
trials, and RT decreased with Level. 
Figure 3: The left panel shows mean RTs by prior US 
experience, the right panel shows mean RTs as a function of 
Level. Error bars give SE of the mean. 
 
There was a significant main effect of run length, F4,240 = 
11.91, p < .001, such that RTs decreased linearly across run 
length, F1,60 = 24.72, MSE = 3794.13, p <.001, η2p = 0.29. 
The main effect of prior US experience was also significant, 
showing that participants were significantly slower to 
respond after a nogo trial (M = 726.93, SE = 19.40) than after 
a go trial (M = 698.09, SE = 18.15), F1,60 = 25.61, p <.001. A 
significant main effect of Level was found, F2,120 = 6.06, p = 
.003, in the form of a significant decreasing linear trend 
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across Level, F1,60 = 9.80, MSE = 976.22, p = .004, η2p = 
0.13. 
 
Expectancies Expectancy ratings made on each trial were 
recorded on E-Prime. Participants rated their expectation of 
the nogoUS. These were transformed to reflect expectancy of 
the goUS using the formula (6) – (expectancy rating). Values 
were averaged and analysed in the same way as the RT data. 
Inclusion of run lengths -4 and +4 did not change the analyses 
so run lengths -3 and +3 were used to maintain 
correspondence with the other analyses (see Figure 3). 
 
A significant main effect of run length was found, F2,95 = 
3.80, p = .035, in the form of a significant cubic trend, F1,60 = 
13.79, MSE = 0.16, p = < .001, η2p = 0.19. Expectancies 
following nogo trials (Mean = 3.10, SD = 0.48) were not 
significantly different from expectancies following go trials 
(Mean = 3.08, SD = 0.50), F1,60 = 0.005, p = .943. The main 
effect of Level was significant, F1,66 = 10.72, p = .001, and 
there was a significant decreasing linear trend across Level, 
F1,60 = 11.20, MSE = 0.25, p = .001, η2p = 0.16. 
 
Figure 4: Mean expectancy ratings as a function of prior US 
experience and Level. Error bars are too small to see easily. 
 
 
These findings are consistent with the gambler’s fallacy; 
participants have a greater expectation of a go trial following 
successive nogo trials and lower expectation following 
successive go trials. Together with the RTs, these results 
show that participants are responding fastest when they least 
expect another go trial. This is consistent with the standard 
Perruchet Effect and suggests that pedal-press responses are 
being driven by something other than the conscious, 
propositional processes driving expectancies. It also suggests 
that the priming effect of a go trial is not expectancy based. 
 
Δforce Data Δforce was recorded throughout the experiment 
using LabChart. Three intervals within each trial were 
identified for analysis, and the integral relative to the baseline 
imposed by LabChart at the start of recording was calculated, 
giving the change in force during that period. These intervals 
were: (1) a 2 second interval during the ITI (integral of 2 
seconds before CS onset), (2) the 5 seconds during CS 
presentation (integral of 5 seconds after CS onset), and (3) a 
2 second interval following US onset during which a response 
would be given on go trials (integral of 7 seconds after CS 
onset minus integral of 5 seconds after CS onset).  
 
Δforce during the ITI A significant main effect of run length 
was found, F1,64 = 4.15, p = .043, such that Δforce decreased 
linearly across run length, F1,60 = 4.28, MSE = 0.000, p = 
.043, η2p = 0.07. Participants were increasing the amount of 
force they applied to the pedal after nogo trials (M = 0.002, 
SE = 0.000), and decreasing the amount of force after go trials 
(M = -0.001, SE = 0.002). These changes were significantly 
greater after nogo trials than after go trials, F1,60 = 4.36, p = 
.041. A one-sample t-test showed that mean Δforce was 
significantly greater than zero after nogo trials, t(60) = 26.10, 
p = < .001, but was not significantly different from zero 
following go trials, t(60) = -0.86, p = .391. This indicates that 
participants were reliably applying more force to the response 
pedal during the ITI after nogo trials, but not following go 
trials. There was no significant main effect of Level, F1,83 = 
2.48, p = .108, suggesting that changes in ITI Δforce were not 
strongly influenced by within-run effects.   
These findings may reflect some preparation for a response 
on the upcoming trial. But given that expectancy did not 
significantly change as a consequence of trial type (- vs. +), 
but did over Level, this pattern is inconsistent with a 
propositional account of the Perruchet effect. In other words, 
we cannot easily attribute variations in ∆force to variations in 
expectancy. 
 
Figure 5: Mean change in force as a function of prior US 
experience during the ITI (left) and the CS (right). Error bars 
give SE of the mean. 
 
Δforce during the CS Averages for this interval (5 sec in 
length) were divided by 2.5 so that the integral value 
corresponded to that of a 2 second interval allowing for better 
comparison between this interval and the ITI.  
A significant main effect of run length was found, F3,205 = 
8.68, p = < .001, in the form of a significant decreasing linear 
trend across run length, F1,60 = 14.42, MSE = 6.80E-7, p < 
.001, η2p = 0.194. One-sample t-tests showed that mean 
Δforce was significantly greater than zero following both 
nogo trials, t(60) = 27.57, df = 60, p = <0.001 and go trials, t 
= 16.77, p = <.001, indicating that participants were applying 
an increasing amount of force to the pedal after CS onset. 
This increase was significantly greater after nogo trials (M = 
0.0019, SE = 0.000) than go trials (M = 0.0015, SE = 0.000), 
F1,60 = 19.65, p < .001. There was no significant effect of 
Level, F2,120 = 0.06, p = .947 suggesting that changes in CS 
Δforce were not driven by trial order, but by prior US 
experience.  
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Δforce during the US The US presentation interval 
contained the response on go trials, so data for go trials (goUS 
Δforce) and nogo trials (nogoUS Δforce) were analysed 
separately.  
 
Figure 6: Mean change in force during the US period as a 
function of prior US experience and Level. The open symbols 
are for go trials, the filled symbols for nogo trials. Error bars 
give SE of the mean. 
 
GoUS Δforce A significant main effect of run length was 
identified, F2,133 = 4.93, p = .007, along with a significant 
decreasing linear trend, F1,60 = 8.57, MSE = 0.000, p = .005, 
η2p = 0.125. One-sample t-tests showed that mean Δforce 
was significantly greater than zero for both levels of prior US 
experience (following no-go trials: t(60) = 2.55, p = .013; 
following go trials: t(60) = 2.21, p = .031) indicating that 
participants were applying an increasing amount of force 
following US onset on go trials. This increase was 
significantly greater following nogo trials (M = 0.009, SE = 
0.004) than go trials (M = 0.007, SE = 0.003), F1,60 = 9.27, p 
= .003. There was a significant main effect of Level, F1,80 = 
4.22, p = .032, in the form of a significant decreasing linear 
trend across Level, F1,60 = 4.22, MSE = 2.56E-5, p = .017, 
η2p = 0.07. 
 
NoGoUS Δforce For nogoUS Δforce there was no significant 
main effect of run length, F3,164 = 0.51, p = .769, prior US 
experience, F1,60 = 1.05, p = .310, or Level, F2,91 = 0.41, p = 
.605. These findings indicate that the amount of force applied 
to the pedal during this interval was not strongly influenced 
by the preceding trial(s).  
The finding that US Δforce varied significantly as a 
function of the independent variables during go trials but not 
nogo trials indicates that the differences observed may be a 
result of the response being present on go trials. To test for 
this a two-factor RM ANOVA was run to examine the 
interaction between each of the three factors separately (run 
length, prior US experience and Level) and trial type (go vs. 
nogo) on US Δforce. The interaction between run length and 
trial type was significant, F2,144 = 4.09, p = .013, as was the 
interaction between prior US experience and trial type, F1,60 
= 7.59, p = .008. The interaction between Level and trial type 
approached significance, F1,89 = 3.36, p = .053. These results 
indicate that the effects of the IVs differ as a function of trial 
type. This is most likely due to the presence of the response 
on go trials. Hence this ∆force measure seems to be capturing 
something about how the response on a given trial is affected 
by previous trials. But note that comparing this analysis to the 
RT data shows that the change in force over the US period 
gets smaller as RTs get faster. We will return to this 
comparison in the General Discussion. 
 
General Discussion 
This experiment adopted a novel method to investigate motor 
activity. The method was designed to measure changes in 
force applied to a response pedal throughout a Go/NoGo RT 
variant of the Perruchet experiment. RTs and expectancies 
described a standard Perruchet Effect; RTs were fastest after 
successive go trials when expectancies for another go trial 
were lowest. The effect of Level on RTs suggests an 
influence of trial order, which is in keeping with the 
associative learning account (McLaren, Green, & 
Mackintosh, 1994). On the other hand, the fact that the effect 
of prior US experience is stronger than that of Level suggests 
that a recency/priming mechanism may be involved as well. 
One aim of this analysis was, therefore, to establish whether 
the Δforce data could help to further interpret these two 
explanations.  
The presence of systematic differences in the Δforce data 
suggests that elements of the experimental paradigm 
influenced changes in preparatory motor activity. Closer 
examination of these differences reveals patterns that cannot 
be easily explained by either the associative or propositional 
accounts of the Perruchet Effect either singly or in 
combination.  
The basic associative account predicts that run length 
should only affect motor activity after CS onset. The effect of 
run length on motor activity during the ITI suggests an 
influence of something other than associations between CS 
and outcome. One possibility might be that this finding 
suggests some influence of the processes involved in forming 
expectations, as these can begin to influence behaviour before 
the CS. Correlations between both ITI and CS Δforce, and 
expectancies, however, showed no significant correlations 
(all r’s < 0.12, all p’s > 0.40) indicating that expectations did 
not influence changes in Δforce. And, as we have already 
remarked, the fact that there is an effect of Level on 
expectancy, but no effect of prior US experience is 
inconsistent with the pattern of results for ∆force. 
So, if a straightforward application of both associative and 
expectancy-based accounts fails, how are we to explain the 
pattern that we see in the force data? We start by postulating 
that the generally increasing force applied as we move out of 
the ITI and the CS is presented reflects some form of motor 
preparation prior to US delivery. In essence, participants are 
getting ready to make a response if it is required.  If we further 
assume that this preparation is, in some way, able to take into 
account other factors that will influence execution of the 
response, then we may be able to explain these variations in 
∆force. 
A first step is to assume that response priming as a 
consequence of having made a response on the previous trial 
manifests as an increase in the force applied to the button. 
This follows from the assumption that there is a US 
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recency/priming effect (Weidemann et al., 2016). Such an 
account predicts that recent production of a response 
heightens or potentiates activation for the following trial, 
leading to less additional activation being needed to reach 
threshold for producing a motor response (Fecteau & Munoz, 
2007; Weidemann & Lovibond, 2016). We would expect this 
to manifest in the ITI and then continue to have an effect up 
to and including the response. But note that the effect is to 
reduce the increase in force recorded after go trials, because 
less preparation is needed due to this response priming 
already producing a higher baseline value of the force on the 
pedal. In other words, there is less need to increase the force 
applied because it is already high. One finding that 
contradicts this hypothesis is that there is no effect of prior 
US experience on nogo trials during the period when the 
nogoUS is presented, but this could be due to a reset 
mechanism that applies if the response does not occur. Note, 
however, that this response priming cannot be cumulative 
over trials on which a response has occurred, otherwise we 
would see an effect of Level in the ITI and we do not. Rather 
it is all-or-none, dependent on whether a response is made or 
not.  
Which leaves us with the effect of Level on go trials in the 
US period to explain, in conjunction with the absence of any 
effect of Level during the CS. One possibility here is that the 
preparation that leads to variation in ∆force cannot allow for 
this effect because it has no knowledge of it. On this 
argument, variations in the CS-US association are 
instantiated via some multiplier on this pathway (or possibly 
on some separate, parallel pathway), whereas response 
priming has a more direct effect and so can be allowed for. 
The response priming effect is a general one, independent of 
the particular outcome used during training, whereas the CS-
US association is more specific in its' effects. The only time 
that this effect can be seen in this experiment is when a 
response is actually given as then the multiplier is effective. 
Now, the greater gain on the pathway means that less source 
activation is required to implement the response. The result 
is a faster response, and a quicker reduction in activation of 
the pathway afterwards (as less initial input to that pathway 
was needed) producing the effect of Level on ∆force. We 
further investigated this effect of Level by running an 
additional two-way RM ANOVA to see if the effects of Level 
during the goUS differed significantly to that during the CS. 
A significant interaction was found, F1,81 = 4.24, p = 0.031, 
indicating that the effect of Level on Δforce differed 
significantly between measurement intervals. This result 
certainly supports the contention that the influence of CS-US 
associations can only be seen on the ∆force measure during 
an actual response.  
Our discussion highlights that the Δforce data cannot easily 
be accounted for by a single mechanism. But whilst we 
cannot unambiguously identify the mechanisms responsible 
for the RT variant of the Perruchet Effect, we can rule out a 
propositional explanation, and provide further confirmation 
of the distinction between effects of prior US experience 
(response priming) and Level (CS-US associations). We 
conclude that this technique is an effective method for 
investigating the Perruchet paradigm.  
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